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Waiver of Tort In Pennsylvania
A quasi-contractual obligation is one arising, without
reference to the assent of the obligor, from the receipt of
a benefit, the retention of which is unjust, and requiring
the obligor to pay the reasonable value of the benefit he
has received, or in other words, requiring the obligor to
make restitution, not in specie but in value. The obligee is
compensated, not for any loss or damage suffered by him,
but for the benefit which he has conferred upon the obligor
under such circumstances as to amount to an unjust en-
richment of the latter. The proper remedy for the en-
forcement of quasi-contractual obligations is an action of
assumpsit, both at common law and under the more mod-
ern actions and modes of pleading. The obligation is
treated, for the purpose of affording a remedy, as though
(quasi) it were a contractual obligation; hence the term
"quasi-contract." The foregoing principles are applicable,
of course, to the whole field of "quasi-contracts," but it
is the present purpose to explain their connection with the
so-called doctrine of "waiver of tort."
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Upon. the commission of a tort an obligation always
rests upon the tort-feasor to- compensate the person in-
jured for the damage suffered by him. But in committing
the tort, it frequently happens that the tort-feasor not on-
Iy causes damage to the person injured but also derives
a. benefit for himself. Where a wrongdoer has enriched
himself through the commission of a tort, he is clearly
under a moral obligation (aside from his obligation to pay
damages) to make restitution of the benefit so received,
either in specie or in value. "It is not surprising that the
courts came to regard this moral obligation to make res-
titution as analogous to a debt, and by the familiar device
of a fictitious promise, brought it within the reach of the
simple and convenient remedy of indebitatus assumpsit."
Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, p. 438.
Thus it is seen that upon the commission of a tort
the tort-feasor is under alternative obligations, (a) to pay
the damages suffered by the plaintiff, or (b) to make res-
titution, i. e., to pay the reasonable value of such benefits
as the defendant has received through the commission of
the tort. Whichever remedy is elected by the plaintiff,
there can be no recovery without proof of the commission
of a tort. The election of the plaintiff to. sue in assumpsit
for the value of benefits received by the defendant, in-
stead of suing in tort for the damages suffered by him-
self, is called "waiver of tort." This is not to be under-
stood as waiver of the wrohig, but as an election of the
remedy o'f assu.mpsit for benefits received by the defend-
ant, waiving the other remedy, an action in tort for dam-
ages.
"Waiver of tort" is sometimes involved in another
situation. The act or omission of the defendant may be
a tort and also a breach of contract. The election of the
plaintiff to sue in assumpsit is an election to regard the
wrongful act of the defendant as a breach of contract and
to waive or disregard the wrongful act as a tort. A fre-
quent example is a seller's breach of express warranty in
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the sale of goods. He may be sued in assumpsit for breach
of warranty, or sometimes, at the election of the buyer, in
tort for deceit. Another example is that suggested in
Zell v. Dunkle, 156 Pa. 353. This phase of waiver of tort
will not be treated in the present article.
It is purposed only to discuss the question of waiver
of tort as first hereivabove set forth,-the election of the
plaintiff, upon the commission of a tort by the defendant,
of the remedy of assumpsit (quasi-contract) for the value
of benefits received by the latter, instead of the usual
remedy of an action ex delicto for the damages suffered
by himself.
Of course, to maintain an action of assumpsit (quasi-
contract) against a tort-feasor, it must appear that he has
derived a benefit from his wrongful act. In Pennsylvania,
as in England and other jurisdictions, the benefit must
consist of money received by the tort-feasor, probably due
to a strict observance of the common count for money had
and received. See Willet v. Willet, 3 Watts, 277; Lamine
v. Dorrell, 2 Ld. Raym. 1216; Hitchin. v. Campbell, 2 Win.
BI. 827; Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285. Other jurisdictions,
however, permit the waiver of the remedy ex delicto and
an action of assumpsit in all cases where the tort results
in the enrichment of the tort-feasor, whether the benefit
received by him consists of money or something else.
Hirsch v. Leatherbee Co., 69 N. J. L. 509; Terry v. Munger,
121 N. Y. 161.
Inasmuch as the fundamental nature of the action of
assumpsit against the tort-feasor is quasi contractual, i.
e., to enforce an obligation to make restitution, it is not
enough to show that the tort-feasor has received a benefit
from his wrong; it must also appear that the benefit re-
ceived was something taken from the plaintiff, and it seems
that what is taken from the plaintiff must not be intan-
gible, such as the wrongful use of property (Phillips v.
Homfray, 24 Ch. D. 439, 460; cf. McSorley v. Faulkner, 18
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N. Y. S. 460), or the wrongful use of a patented process.
Schillinger v. U. S., 155 U. S. 163.
Conversion
The doctrine of waiver of tort, i. e., an action of as-
sumpsit as an alternative remedy for tort, is most fre-
quently used where the defendant has committed the tort
of conversion. If the tort consists of the wrongful de-
struction of the plaintiff's personal property, the wrong-
doer derives no benefit from his act and the only remedy
against him is an action in tort for damages. But the con-
version may consist of a wrongful taking, detention, use
or disposition of personal property. In this class of cases,
the converter is usually enriched, and to the extent that
he is, he ought to make restitution. The Pennsylvania
courts early recognized such an obligation. In Hill v. Wal-
lace, Addison 145, the plaintiff delivered wheat to the mill
of the defendant who misapplied it. The court held an
action of assumpsit would lie. In Finney v. M'Mahon, 1
Yeates 248, the defendant converted a bear killed by the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff was permitted to recover the
value in an action of assumpsit.
That the benefit received by the wrongdoer must con-
sist of money seems not to have been squarely decided
until Willet v. Willet, 3 Watts 277. The defendant had il-
legally detained the chattel of the plaintiff who sued in
assumpsit for its value, but the court held that the tort of
conversion could be waived and an action brought in as-
sumpsit only when the tort-feasor has sold the converted
chattel and received the money therefor. Later cases have
strictly followed this limitation. See Deysher v. Triebel,
64 Pa. 383, and cases cited infra. However it has been
held that there may be waiver of tort and an action in as-
sumpsit against a convertor when lie has turned the goods
into money, or there is a presumption that he has done so.
Gray v. Griffith, 10 Watts, 431; Satterlee v. Melick, 76 Pa.
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62; Frey v. L. V. Shoe Co., 4 D. 84 C. 735. Such a pre-
sumption of sale by the defendant arose where it was
merely shown that he had taken the converted goods to
market, McCullough v. McCullough, 14 Pa. 295.
Where the wrongdoer remains in possession of the
converted goods or wrongfully detains them, there can be
no waiver of the tort and assumpsit will not lie. Deysher
v. Triebel, supra, where defendant wrongfully received,
though in good faith, goods consigned to a third person;
Bethlehem Borough v. Perseverance Fire Co., 81 Pa. 445,
where the borough under a clam of right illegally took
possession of the plaintiff's property. In the latter case it
was said that assumpsit will not lie for the value of a chat-
tel wrongfully detained (Boyer v. Bullard, 102 Pa. 555)
unless the defendant has sold the goods and received the
money or has taken them for the purpose of sale and there
is no evidence to rebut the presumption of a sale and
the receipt of money. Without something more than mere
illegal detention there can be no assumpsit. Weiler v.
Kershner, 109 Pa. 219.
In Satterlee v. Melick, supra, the court said that where
the defendant merely detains the plaintiff's goods or loses
them through negligence, and does nothing to show as-
sumption of ownership as a vendee, such as conversion to
his own use or consumption, assumpsit will not lie for goods
sold and delivered. In that case the defendant who was
to saw the plaintiff's timber did not return all the lum-
ber. In Deysher v. Triebel, supra, it was said that if the
wrongful possession of goods was accompanied by any
fraud or unfair practice, assumpsit would lie as for goods
sold and delivered. But if the goods were turned into
money, assumpsit would lie for money had and received
unless under the circumstances the defendant might with
goods conscience retain it. In another case it was said
that there can be no waiver of tort so long as the conver-
tor remains in possession, but that assumpsit, is proper
where the wrongdoer has by sale or lease, or otherwise,
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put it out of his power to respond in an action against him
for the recovery of the goods themselves. Rees & Sons
Co. v. Exposition Society, 44 Super. Ct. 381; accord, Reilly
v. Holman, 31 Lanc. 285. It is submitted that the majority
of decisions do not justify these cases, since the doctrine
of waiver of the tort of conversion has been limited to
cases where the defendant has turned the goods into
money or has presumably done so. Other interesting cases
where the converted goods had been turned into money and
assumpsit was held to lie are: Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. 59;
Kellam v. Kellam, 94 Pa. 225; Pryor v. Morgan, 170 Pa.
568 That sale of the converted goods and receipt of mon-
ey therefor must be shown to permit an action of as-
sumpsit, see Parry v. First National Bank, 270 Pa. 557.
Where the conversion consists of the wrongful tak-
ing or detention of money, it is obvious that the tort may
be waived and an action of assumpsit brought for the
money; Second National Bank v. Gardner, 171 Pa. 267,
where the bank sued a defaulting cashier in assumpsit for
the money he had stolen. In- South Hills Trust Co. v.
Baker, 278 Pa. 481, upon similar facts, the court said,
"Where personal property has been wrongfully taken and
converted into money or money's worth, the owner may
waive the tort and sue the wrongdoer in contract for
money had and received .... If that which is taken is al-
ready in the form of money, the decisions are uniform to
the effect that the owner may waive the tort and sue in
contract to recover it." Likewise, if a third person is the
thief and deposits the money with the defendant, who is
then notified of the plaintiff's ownership, it is the defend-
ant's duty to hold it for the plaintiff, and the latter may
waive the tort and sue in assumpsit if the defendant re-
stores the money to the thief or to another upon his order.
Hindmarch v. Hoffman, 127 Pa. 284; Franklin Trust Co.
v. Hegh, 6 D. & C. 231.
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Fraud and Deceit
Where goods are obtained by fraud, the tort of con-
version has been committed. Consequently the victim of
the fraud has the same right to elect assumpsit as a rem-
edy as in other cases of conversion. Accordingly there
can be no waiver of the tort unless the wrongdoer has
converted the goods into money. Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44
Pa. 9; see also McElwee v. McCreight, 236 Pa. 545. But
where through the fraud of the defendant the plaintiff
has been induced to part with money, and action of assump-
sit will lie for the recovery thereof. waiving the tort action
for damages for deceit. Mathers v. Pearson, 13 S. & R.
258; Humbird v. Davis, 210 Pa. 311; Whitney v. Haskell,
216 Pa. 622.
Of course, if the fraudulent defendant has received no
benefit from the plaintiff there is no basis whatsoever for
an action of assumpsit and the only remedy is in tort for
damages, Hopkins v. Beebe, 26 Pa. 85, where the defendant
fraudulently conspired with his debtor to defeat the plain-
tiff, another creditor.
False Imprisonment
If one who is guilty of the tort of false imprisonment
is benefited by the labor which his victim is compelled to
perform, he may, at the option of the plaintiff, be held re-
sponsible in assumpsit for the reasonable value of the
services rendered. This rule was applied in Negro Peter
v. Steel, 3 Yeates 250, where the defendant had compelled
a free negro to work as a slave. Assumpsit was held to
lie although, as the court pointed out, no true contract ex-
press or implied could have been shown inasmuch as the
plaintiff was held against his will. This merely shows that
assumpsit is the proper remedy to enforce a quasi-con-
tractual obligation.
It has been held, however, that if the defendant al-
though guilty of the tort of false imprisonment, in good
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faith has paid a third person for the servitude of the plain-
tiff, no action for assumpsit will lie, because having once
paid he may in good conscience retain the plaintiff's ser-
vices without further compensation; Urie v. Johnston, 3
P. & W. 212, where a slave after his discharge on habeas
corpus sued the defendant for his services in assumpsit, the
defendant having paid the owner of the plaintiff's mother
for his services.
Negligence
It is generally conceded that a negligent defendant
cannot be sued in assumpsit upon any theory of waiver of
tort. The only remedy is an action for damages in tort.
Krouse v. R. R. Co., 4 Pa. C. C. 60; Sergeant v. Emlen, 141
Pa. 581; Comm. v. Press Co., 156 Pa. 516; York Trust Co.,
15 York 137, 141. In the last case the court said there is
no implied promise on the part of the defendant to pay
damages caused by his negligence. The real reason why
assumpsit is not a proper remedy is that there can be no
quasi-contractual remedy where the defendant has received
no benefit, and it is difficult to conceive of a situation
where the defendant would receive a benefit from the
plaintiff whom he has negligently injured.
Trespass: Use and Occupation
Ordinarily a mere trespasser upon the land of another
derives no benefit from his wrongful act, and therefore
the only remedy of the plaintiff would be an action in tort
for damages. But if the trespasser severs and removes
timber, stone, etc., the tort may be waived and an action
in assumpsit brought against him for the value of the bene-
fit thus received by him; Dundas v. Muhlenberg's Exr., 35
Pa. 351. In this case the defendant, a trespasser, removed
coal from the plaintiff's land, and the plaintiff was per-
mitted to sue in assumpsit for the value of the coal taken
on the theory of waiver of tort. But if the defendant does
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more than commit a mere trespass and actually takes pos-
session of the land, he cannot, after being removed from
possession in an action of ejectment, be sued in assumpsit
for oil mined while he was in wrongful possession. The
only remedy is an action in tort for mesne profits. Reilly
v. Crown Petroleum Co., 213 Pa. 595. This is analogous
to the principle that a wrongdoer cannot be sued in as-
sumpsit for the value of the use and occupation of land
while he was in wrongful possession. The reason for this
is historical,-the development of the common law actions
of debt and assumpsit. Modern decisions adhere to the
common law principle that a recovery for use and occupa-
tion in assumpsit must be based on privity of contract,
express or implied, as for example, use and occupation by
permission. If the defendant is a mere trespasser or dis-
seisor, there can be no waiver of the tort by suing in as-
sumpsit for the value of use and occupation. Brolasky v.
Ferguson, 48 Pa. 434; McCloskey v. Miller, 72 Pa. 151;
National Oil Refining Co. v. Bush, 88 Pa. 335. The only
remedy against the disseisor is an action in tort for mesne
profits, but strangely enough, the measure of damages is
the same as it would be in an action of assumpsit waiving
the tort,-the reasonable value of the use and occupation.
Morrison v. Robinson, 31 Pa. 456.
Joinder of Parties
If the tort committed by the defendant injures the
joint interest of several plaintiffs, such as co-tenants of
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property, all of the plaintiffs must be joined in a tort.ac-
tion for damages. The cause of action and the wrong-
doer's liability are joint, and therefore the form of action,
whether in tort or in assumpsit waiving the tort, must be
joint. In Irwin's Admr. v. Brown's Exr., 35 Pa. 331, the
defendant cut down timber belonging to three co-tenants,
sold it, and applied the proceeds to his own use. One of
the co-tenants sued in assumpsit for money had and re-
ceived. It was held that all of the co-tenants should have
joined in the action.
The liability of joint tort-feasors is joint and several.
The plaintiff may sue them all jointly or bring separate
actions against each. Rowland v. Philadelphia, 202 Pa. 50;
Burkett v. Van Tine, 277 Pa. 567. But suppose the injured
party is entitled to elect to sue in assumpsit for restitution,
waiving the tort. He is not entitled to a joint judgment
if one of the tort-feasors has derived no benefit from the
wrongful act, nor is he entitled to a joint judgment if each
has received a benefit, for the obligation to make restitu-
tion is essentially several, each tort-feasor being liable to
the extent of the benefit received by him.
Survival of Action
If the circumstances permit a waiver of tort so that
there may be an action of assumpsit, the action, being ex
contractu, will survive the death of either party. Kimble
v. Carothers, 81 Pa. 494.
Bankruptcy
If the plaintiff can waive the tort, his claim for resti-
tution being ex contractu is provable as a claim in bank-
ruptcy. Clark v. Rogers, 183 Fed. 518. This being so, the
claimant cannot, by electing to adhere to his remedy in
tort, successfully contend that his claim is not one dis-
chargeable by the bankruptcy proceedings. Crawford v.
Burke, 195 U. S. 176.
t oo
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Statute of Limitations
The statutory period which bars actions for tort fre-
quently differs from that which bars actions on contract.
Where the plaintiff waives the tort and sues in assumpsit,
it, is generally held that he is entitled to the statutory
limitation as to actions ex contractu. Kirkman v. Phillips,
7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 222; Bell v. Bank, 153 Cal. 234; Miller v.
Miller, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 133. This question is unimportant
in Pennsylvania, inasmuch as the statutory period for the
tort of conversion (usually involved in waiver of tort cases)
is the same as that for actions ex contractu,-six years.
If the plaintiff elects to waive the tort and sue in as-
sumpsit, it has been held that the statute commences to
run, not from the date of the commission of the tort, but
from the date of the receipt by the defendant of the bene-
fit derived from his wrongful act. Miller v. Miller, supra;
Browning v. Cover, 108 Pa. 595. However, it was held in
Currier v. Studley, 159 Mass. 17, that if the defendant holds
the converted chattel for more than the statutory period in
which it could be recovered and thereby becomes the own-
er, and thereafter sells the chattel and receives the money,
the plaintiff cannot then sue in assumpsit for money had
and received.
Auxiliary Remedies
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the assistance of
such auxiliary remedies as attachment, capias and warrant
of arrest, usually depends on the action, i. e., some are
proper only in actions ex delicto and others only in actions
ex contractu. For instance, before the Act of March 30,
1905, P. L. 76, a writ of foreign attachment would not is-
sue in actions ex delicto. But if the plaintiff could waive
the tort and sue in assumpsit, the writ would issue, al-
though the affidavit of cause of action must not sound in
tort, and the damages had to be liquidated. See Boyer v.
Bullard, 102 Pa. 555; Wood v. Virginia Hot Springs Co.,
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202 Pa. 40; Fisher v. Cunard Steamship Co., 19 Dist. R. 387.
Under the Act of March 17, 1869, P. L. 8, and the
amendments, a fraudulent debtor's attachment will issue in
certain actions ex contractu, but is not issuable in actions
ex delicto. But where goods, chattels or money have been
stolen, converted or fraudulently obtained, and the plain-
tiff can waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, the attachment
will issue. O'Neill v. Brown, 17 Dist. R. 1062; Franklin
Trust Co. v. Hegh, 6 D. & C. 231; Wilson & Co. v. Lehman
& Co., 2 Lack. Leg. News, 352.
Under the Act of July 12, 1842, P. L. 339, the body
of the defendant may be taken under a capias ad respond-
endum in actions for tort, and under a warrant of arrest in
actions involving fraudulent contracts. In Koehler v. Wood-
ford, 1 D. & C. 784, it was held that where the plaintiff has
an election between an action ex contractu and an action
ex delicto, capias will not lie, but the proper writ, if any, is
warrant of arrest.
Under the Act of June 16, 1836, Sec. '35, P. L. 755,
where judgment has been obtained against the defend-
ant, and it is desired to levy on goods belonging to the
defendant in the hands of a third person or upon "debts
due" the defendant from third persons, an attachment ex-
ecution for this purpose will issue. Where the defendant
has a cause of action against a third person for the con-
version of goods and the tort could be waived, there is a
debt due the defendant, within the meaning of the statute,
which canbe levied upon under an attachment execution.
Balliet v. Brown, 103 Pa. 546.
Pleadings and the Practice Act
Under the Practice Act of 1915, Act of May 14, 1915,
P. L. 483, there are two forms of action, trespass and as-
sumpsit. In actions of assumpsit the defendant must file
an affidavit of defense and under Section 17, plaintiff may
get judgment for want of an affidavit of defense or for
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want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. In actions of
trespass, the defendant need not file any affidavit of de-
fense, and judgment cannot be taken against him for fail-
ure to do so. Wilson v. Adams Express Co., 72 Super. Ct.
384; Parry v. First National Bank, 270 Pa. 556, 562.
There are two advantages in suing in assumpsit. In-
asmuch as an affidavit of defense is required, the plaintiff
may get judgment for want of an affidavit of defense, or
will at least get a disclosure of the defendant's defense.
Thus the waiver of tort, where it is permissible, and the
election of the remedy of assumpsit is of no little practical
importance. The action in assumpsit to enforce the de-
fendant's obligation to make restitution, waiving the tort
action for damages, is quasi-contractual. But it has been
held that the Practice Act is applicable to implied assump-
sit, another term for "quasi-contract." Hinsdale v. Call,
78 Super. Ct. 121. The election to sue either in trespass
or assumpsit, as defined in the Practice Act, rests entirely
with the plaintiff, and it has been held that where the
plaintiff sues in trespass, although he could have waived
the tort and sued in assumpsit, the statement of claim is
not subject to attack nor the defendant entitled to judg-
ment on the pleadings under Section 20, providing for-a
statutory demurrer. Dittus' Exr. v. Neff, 27 Dist. R. 673.
Some cases have held that the plaintiff cannot, by
waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit, obtain the ad-
vantage of the requirement of an affidavit of defense.
Corry v. Penna. R. R. Co., 194 Pa. 516; Southern Steamship
Co. v. Hull, 46 Super. Ct. 299; Jeffrey v. American Feder-
ation of Labor, 282 Pa. 123. But in these cases, the state-
ment of claim alleged essentially and substantially a cause
of action in tort, or perhaps were not cases for the appli-
cation of the doctrine of waiver of tort, which has been
seen above to be confined within somewhat narrow limits
in Pennsylvania.
Two recent cases well illustrate the problem. In
South Hills Trust Co. v. Baker, 278 Pa. 481, the plaintiff
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sued in assumpsit to recover money which had been em-
bezzled by the defendant. The court expressly recognized
the doctrine of waiver of tort (see excerpt from the opin-
ion hereinabove), and said that there was no doubt that
under the facts before it, the plaintiff could waive the tort
and maintain an action of assumpsit. Therefore an affi-
davit of defense was held to be necessary and judgment
was entered against the defendant for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defense. The court distinguished the earlier
case of Parry v. First National Bank, 270 Pa. 557. In that
case, too, there had been a motion for judgment against
the defendant for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.
The plaintiff had sued in assumpsit for a money judgment
for certain stocks and bonds deposited with and converted
by defendant. The court held that the action was essen-
tially one in tort and therefore an affidavit of defense was
not required. Consequently the rule for judgment was
discharged. In distinguishing this case, the court in the
later case (South Hills Trust Co. v. Baker, supra,) pointed
out that in the Parry case there was no allegation of a
sale of the converted property, nor of the receipt of value
therefor, nor of the receipt of money for the plaintiff's ac-
count. In other words the allegations of the statement of
claim in the Parry case did not make out a proper case for
waiver of tort. It is believed that this explanation of the
Parry case will explain the decisions of the cases cited in
the preceding paragraph.
If the plaintiff sues in.assumpsit and it is then found
out that it is not a proper case for waiver of tort but that
the action should have been in trespass, the court will
permit an amendment, even after the verdict if necessary.
Comm . v. Press Co., 156 Pa. 516. This is so even if -the
period of the Statute of Limitations has expired, inasmuch
as no change in the ca'use of action is sought, but merely
a change in the form of action or remedy for the same
cause of action. Smith v. Bellows, 77 Pa. 441; see also N.
Y. & Penna. Co. v. N. Y. C. R. R., 267 Pa. 64, 76; Lehigh
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National Bank v. Seyfried, 283 Pa. 1. But where the
amendment changing the form of action is permitted,
the court may continue the case, and may even require the
plaintiff to pay all costs up to the time of amendment.
Roebling v. Amusement Co., 231 Pa. 261; King v. Myers.
60 Super. Ct. 345.
The doctrine of waiver of tort plays an important
role in another phase of pleading under the Practice Act.
Under Section 14 (and before) in actions of assumpsit a
defendant may set-off or set up by way of counterclaim
against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim for
which an action of assumpsit would lie. The set-off or
counterclaim may be set up only in actions of assumpsit.
Bebelheimer v. Minnig, 3 D. & C. 319. But it is the form of
the plaintiff's action that is important rather than the cause
of action. So where a tort is waived and the suit is in as-
sumpsit, there can be a set-off or counterclaim. Bank of
U. S. v. Macalester, 9 Pa. 475; Garrison v. Bryant, 10 Phila.,
474.
Likewise only claims for which an action of assumpsit
would lie, may be made the basis of a set-off or counter-
claim. Backer v. Remov, 69 Super. Ct- 138. A claim en-
tirely based upon tort may not be used as a set-off or
counterclaim. Snell v. Nickles, 1 D. & C. 487. But if the
tort may be waived, the claim then being one in assumpsit
is proper as a set-off or counterclaim. Frey v. Lehigh
Valley Shoe Co., 4 D. & C. 735; Bratspis v. Kaplan, 82 Super.
Ct. 542; Rohrbach v. Travelers Insurance Co., 278 Pa. 74.
Effect of Judgment
Where the defendant has committed a tort and the
plaintiff is entitled to elect between an action ex delicto for
damages and an action in assumpsit for the benefit derived
by the defendant, what constitutes an election between the
right to recover damages and the right to restitution? In
Hyde v. Kiehl, 183 Pa. 414, it was held that the tort ac-
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tion prosecuted to judgment is a bar to a subsequent ac-
tion in assumpsit for the money received by the defendant
from the sale, and vice versa, but that nothing less than
prosecution of the suit to judgment can have such effect.
Where there are joint tort-feasors, may the plaintiff elect
one remedy against one defendant and the other remedy
against another defendant? In Floyd v. Brown, 1 Rawle
121, the plaintiff recovered judgment in tort against one
wrongdoer for the value of goods carried away. It was
held that the judgment was a bar to a later action of as-
sumpsit against another of the wrongdoers for the pro-
ceeds of a sale of the goods.
FRED S. REESE
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MOOT COURT
J. ROSE VS. COMMONWEALTH
Taxation-Intestates--Tangible Personalty in Other States.-Due
Process--Deductions
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Robert Rose was a resident of Pennsylvania and domiciled there
at the time of his death on April 1, 1920. He bequeathed to his
wife large amounts of personalty situated in Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Maryland and also devised to her certain realty in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The executor paid the Federal tax
due. In computing the Pennsylvania tax no credit was allowed for
the federal taxes paid and the tax was assessed against the value
of all the personalty and realty mentioned. His executor has ap-
pealed from the action of the lower court in approving this as-
sessment.
Brown, for Plaintiff.
A. Curtis, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Di Mona, J. The constitutionality of two particular features of
the Pennsylvania statute imposing a tax on the transfer of prop-
erty by will or intestate, must be determined in order to test the
legality of the tax assessment, on which this appeal is brought.
Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Act of June 20, 1919, P. L. 521,
provides, "that where a person domiciled in that state dies siezed
or possessed of property, real or personal, a tax shall be laid on
the transfer of the property from him by will or intestate, whether
the property be in that state or elsewhere."
By the application of this provision of the statute to the estate
of Rose, the taxing officers included the value of real property lo-
cated in New Jersey and personal property located in New Jersey
and Maryland, on the clear value of which they computed the tax.
The question is now raised as to the right of the state to tax proper-
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ty having a situs in another state. As concerned the real property,
located in New Jersey, it is our opinion that the state erred in so
doing, for it has always been conceded that real property is taxable
only by that state which has jurisdiction over it, and even though
the owner was domiciled in Pennsylvania, the succession of the
real estate of a deceased depends upon the law of the state in
which it is situated and not upon that of the domicile of the owner,
and there is no jurisdiction upon which to base an inheritance tax
in the state of the owner's domicile, 26 R. C. L. 211. Justice Mitch-
ell, in dissenting from the decision reached in Vanuxen's Estate,
212 Pa. 323 said, "The taxation of real property not within the
territorial limits of the state is admittedly beyond the legislative
power, and the taxation of the value of such property, under what-
ever form or disguise it is sought to be exercised is upon the border
line of questionable jurisdiction and should be scrutinized closely
with every presumption against its validity."
In determining its right to tax the personal property located in
New Jersey and Maryland we need only refer to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in the case of Frick vs. Common-
wealth, 268 U. S. 473, wherein they reversed the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, by denying the power of the state of the domicile to
exact a succession or inheritance tax in respect to tangible personal
property having an actual situs in another state, holding further that
for a Pennsylvania statute to attempt to tax the tangible personal
property having an actual situs in states other than Penna., trans-
cends the power of that state, and thereby contravenes the due
process of law clause of the 14th amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. As no mention is made as to whether any of
the property of this case was intangible in character, we shall not
discuss the result to be reached had any of the property been of
this nature. Although prior to the U. S. Supreme Court's decision
in Frick's Estate, the tendency of the courts to regard that state
as having jurisdiction wherein the owner of personal property was
domiciled, the modern viewpoint is to consider jurisdiction to be
in the state wherein the property is located, when such personal
property is capable of having a situs of its own, Pullman Car Co.
vs. Pa., 141 U. S. 18; Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. 1; Bond Case, 15 Wall.
300.
Section 2 of the act heretofore mentioned provides that, "in
ascertaining the clear value of such estates, no deduction shall be
allowed from the gross value of the estate, for or on account of any
taxes paid to the government of the United States or to any other
state or territory.
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The plaintiffs in error contend that this provision is invalid,
insofar as the state tax is in part a tax on the Federal tax, and that
by so doing it taxes property which the legatee never received. To
support this contention they cite Smith's Estate, 49 C. C. 453. As
this point was also discussed and settled by the United States
Supreme Court in deciding Frick vs. Commonwealth, 268 U. S. 473,
let us again refer to what was said there. "The power of taxation
in state and federal governments is generally so far concurrent as
to render it admissible for both, each under its laws and for its own
proposes, to tax the same subject at the same time, and neither
the United States or a state in determining the amount of estate
tax, or transfer tax, respectively, is under any constitutional obli-
gation to make any deduction on account of the other. While a
federal tax is called an estate tax and the state tax is called a trans-
fer tax, both are imposed as excises on the transfer of property
from a decedent and both take effect at the instant of transfer. Thus
both are laid on the same subject, and neither has priority in time
over the other." In accord with this holding are, Knowlton vs.
Moore, 178 U. S. 41, Kirpatrick's Estate, 275 Pa. 217.
In conclusion, we hold, first, that the value of the real property
in New Jersey and the personal property in New Jersey and Mary-
land, should not have been included in determining the clear value
on which the Pennsylvania tax was computed and, secondly, that there
was no error in refusing to make any deductions from the clear value
on account of the estate tax imposed by the United States. In
view of the foregoing conclusions, it is our opinion that the learned
court below erred in approving such an assessment. The property
situated in New Jersey and Maryland could pot be taxed and for
that part of the assessent, judgment is reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The opinion of the learned court below is rather complete and
has made a correct analysis of the law. He should not, however,
omit the discussion as to intangibles because the property in question
was not stated to be such, but that fact should impel its inclusion for
completeness. Intangible personalty, though in another state, may
be taxed by the domiciliary state.
The tax may not be assessed against the realty situated in N. J.
and Md. nor against the tangible personalty located there. The tax
may legally be assessed only against the realty in Pa., the personalty
in Pa., and the intangible personalty situated elsewhere.
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Frick vs. Commonwealth, 268 U. S. 473; Same, 277 Pa. 242;
Hogg's Estate, 284 Pa. 1; and In re Robinson's Estate, 132 AtI. 129,
all decide these points.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
JIMSON VS. BARD
JIMSON VS. X COUNTY
Highways-Obstruction--Hedges--Municpalities--Nuiance--Act of
June 14, 1913 P. L. 801
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bard was the owner of land adjoining intersecting highways.
He permitted high hedges to grow on the edge of his land so that
parties approaching at right angles on the highway could not see
the approach of the other. Jimson, in an automobile, collided with
one driven by Heath at this intersection. Jimson sued Bard for
$5000 for his personal injuries suffered and also sued X County
for permitting the hedges to remain. The lower court non-suited
the plaintiff in both cases and he appealed.
Allman, for Plaintiff.
Bayton, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Bickel, J. The case presents two questions for determination
by this court. The first is the individual liability of the property
owner to the plaintiff in maintaining high hedges at the edge of his
lands. The second question for the determination of this court is the
liability of X county in permitting the hedges to remain without
being trimmed.
This question is by no means a new one for the determinotion
of this court.
In a case where the facts were identical with these the Supreme
Court of the State of Kansas held, "An owner of land adjoining
crossing highways along which high hedges obstructed the view,
is not liable to persons injured in an automobile collision." Bohm
vs. Racette, 118 Kansas 670; Goodaile vs. Cowley County,. Ill Kan-
sas 542.
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In the first case the court also decided that the county or town-
ship was not liable for damages in auto collision at highways
crossing where view was obstructed by high hedges.
The law ordinarily holds the municipality only to a duty to keep
in repair the traveled portions of its roads, and it is not as a general
rule, liable for defects or obstructions outside of such portion.
Brophy vs. Cleveland Township, 236 Pa. 426, Schaeffer vs. Jackson
Township, 150 Pa. 145, 18 L. R. A. 100.
A defect in the highway making the county liable for injuries
is something that interferes with the movement over it, and roads
in good condition but made dangerous by something on their sides
are not for that reason defective.
At common law any act or obstruction which unnecessarily in-
commodes the lawful use of a highway by the public and makes an
individual, who without authority of law creates a dangerous con-
dition in the highways, liable to a person injured thereby, is gen-
erally based on the theory.that the obstruction is or constitutes a
nuisance. But by the facts in the case at bar the hedges were not
in or on the highway but on the private property of the plaintiff.
And this court knows of no theory on which it could base a decision
that hedges on private land cause a nuisance merely because of
their height. The hedge was no part of the highway. So far as
the highway was concerned it did not matter whether there was a
hedge there or not. It may have been big or little, and the highway
be in perfect condition.
In the present action neither the X county nor the owner of
the land is liable unless made so by statute. No statute is cited
making either county or property owner liable for damages sus-
tained for failure to trim the hedge or cause it to be trimmed. Judg-
ment of the lower court affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Actual cases presenting precisely the point involved here are
comparatively rare. As far as can be ascertained, there has been
no analogous decision in the Pennsylvania courts. It presents an
interesting question, however. The Act of June 14, 1923, P. L. 801
is of little assistance. It merely gives the authority to condemn
such a hedge as this one but does not compel it. The fact, that the
view is to be condemned rather than taken by way of exercising the
police power, is of some significance. It would tend to show that
the legislature did not consider such a growth as a nuisance. We
cannot regard the allowing of the hedge to grow in such a place
as a negligent or wrongful act. Such a holding would compel many
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an owner to lose valuable rights in his land. Are not buildings to
be placed on intersecting corners? Bard was well within his rights
and non-suiting the plaintiff as to his case was correct. Nor can the
county be liable for acts other than occuring on the highway proper.
Their failure to condemn under the act mentioned is not negligence.
Nor is there any principle of the common law holding them respon-
sible.
The only direct authorities available are the Kansas cases cited,
Goodaile vs. Crowley County, 11 Kan. 542, and Bohm vs. Racette et
al, 118 Kan. 670. They furnish a persuasive precedent for the
holding of the learned court below. Affirmed.
BROWN'S ESTATE
Executors and Administrators-Trusts and Trustees--Commissions-
Adequacy-Same Person as Executor and Trustee
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brown died leaving an estate of $25,000 consisting of stocks and
bonds of various corporations. He appointed the West Trust Co.
as executor and as trustee for his two unmarried daughters to col-
lect and pay over the income until their death or marriage. At the
audit of its account as executor, the Trust Company claimed credit
for 5% commissions. The daughters claim that 3% is a proper al-
lowance. The Orphans' Court allowed the larger sum.
Stayton, for Plaintiff.
Tompkins, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ettinger, J. The Trust Company at the audit of its account for
work performed in the dual capacity of executor and trustee claims
credit for commission of 5% on the approximate sum of $25,000.
This money consisted of stocks and bonds, being the estate of Brown
which was bequeathed to his two married daughters, who, through
their counsel, object to such payment maintaining that 3% would be
a proper amount.
It is conceded by counsel for the plaintiff that the Trust
Company because of its assiduous and copious work necessarily at-
tached to the administration of a trust estate is entitled to some
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compensation for its efforts. The reason for allowing such compen-
sation to executors and trustees is to reward them not only for
their time, labor, and trouble in administering the estate, but also
for the responsibility incurred and for the fidelity and zeal with
which they discharge the duties of their trust.
The Decedents Act of 1917, Sec. 45 provides that the executor
and trustee must at the time of the audit receive a single commission
which shall be deemed full compensation for its services in the ca-
pacity of executor and trustee.
Thus since a compensation is deserved and it must be a
single one the question which necessarily presents itself for our
determination is whether the charge of 5% is excessive.
In order to arrive at the amount of compensation to which
the executors are entitled, it is therefore necessary to determine
the amount of labor performed, the responsibility imposed and the
amount of the estate. These are all elements which enter into and
determine not only the amount of the compensation but the right
to compensation at all. Considering these as applied to this case, it
seems that 5% is surely a meager allowance for the responsibility
and labor of the executor during the year of administration and for
that which may continue thereafter for the life-time of the cestuis
que trust, if they should decide to remain unmarried.
In Rogers Estate, 17 W. N. C. 29, the executor was allowed a
commission of 5% on $70,000. judge Penrose who delivered the opin-
ion of the court said that an allowance of not over 3 or 3y2% would
be ample if the accountant's connection with the estate would cease
at the settlement of his account, but that a different rule appeared
to have been established where the estate is awarded to him as trus-
tee and where under the Act of 1864, but one commission was to
be allowed and also that the labor required of him in the latter ca-
pacity, that is, of trustee, would have to be taken into consider-
ation.
The cases cited by counsel for the defendants are those in which
the administering of the estates required but little time and work,
as where the assets of the estate were collected without difficulty
or delay, and their distribution attended with no controversy and
there was no proof of exceptional or extraordinary services. In
another case where he alleges that 3% was held to be a proper al-
lowance an examination of the facts reveals that the commission
arose from the sale of real estate and not remuneration for taking
care of the estate. In still another case the sole duty of the execu-
tors was to transfer an estate consisting of bank stock to the lega-
tees of the testator.
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The case at bar differs widely from all of these. The bare name
of stock imports the necessity of careful handling, diligent con-
sideration and much time which needs be expended on the study of
conditions before a sale should be made. The responsibility and
time necessary for the successful fulfillment and discharge of the
duties in the administration of trusts such as these are necessarily
great.
Our law proceeds on the theory that executors and trusteeg
should be reasonably and fairly compensated for their labor and
responsibility, and that it is to the interest of the cestui que trust
that they should be, No rate of percentage is fixed. The extent
of the services rendered greatly assists the court in fixing the true
compensation due him.
In Southerland's Estate, 203 Pa. 160, a fee of 35/% was allowed
where the estate consisted merely of a mortgage and a few cash
items. While in Middleton's Estate, 66 Super. 56, the court allowed
5% where the facts were similar to those in this case.
Under the circumstances of the case we feel that it was proper
for the Orphans' Court to allow the executor 5%, the duties and
responsibilities both being much more than ordinary, and the ser-
vices being both as executor and trustee. Affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The case discloses a point which is not without difficulty. As
seen in Sec. 45, of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917, one holding the dual
capacity of executor and trustee is entitled to but one commission
on the principal for his services. But when should this commission
on the principal for his services as trustee be allowed him? It
would appear to have been the intention of the legislature that this
single commission must be paid at the audit of its account as execu-
tor. To allow the commission for the execution of the trust at
such a time is to hypothecate on the duties and responsibility that
will be involved. But to pay the commission only when the trust
is ended would be unjust. In most cases, the trustee's estate would
alone receive the benefit. The most equitable method would seem
to be to allow a conservative commission on the principal at the
audit of the account as executor. Should the duties prove more
arduous and involve greater responsibility than anticipated, he may
still receive a commission on the income of the trust when it has
ended or during its fulfillment, to compensate for these additional
duties.
The case of Middleton's Estate, 66 Super. 55, while displaying
a marked fondness for contrary holdings, decided that a commission
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of 5% on an estate such as this, paid at the audit of the account
as executor, was correct. No later case appears to the contrary and
we accept that case as the present law.
The able opinion of the learned court below is affirmed.
CARSON VS. RAILROAD
Railroads--Duty to Maintain Private Crossings--Act of February
29, 1849 P. L. 79--Equity-Mandatory Injunction
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Railroad has acquired a right of way by condemnation,
over the plaintiff's land. It constructed a crossing for his use,
but later destroyed it, and has repeatedly refused to replace it. The
plaintiff brings a bill in equity, praying for a mandatory injunction,
compelling the reconstruction of the crossing. The defendant con-
tends, in general, that there is no right violated, and that, if there
be a right, the remedy for its violation is at law.
Davis, for Plaintiff.
Bohl, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Bobkowski, J. In the determination of the case at bar, the
court is first confronted with the question as to the existence and
source of the right sought to be enforced. Such right as contended for
by the plaintiff, is not based on contract, but is a statutory right con-
ferred upon landowners whose land has been taken by a railroad
in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. See Act of Feb. 9,
1849, P. L. 79, Sec. 12. That this statute confers a legal right is an
adjudicated fact, supported by numerous decisions. Dimmick vs. D.
L. R. Co. 180 Pa. 460; Green vs. R. 'R. Co., 245 Pa. 35.
Having determined that such a right exists, the next question
presented to this court, is as to the manner of enforcing it. The
Act of 1849, supra, creating such a right, also makes the railroad
company liable to the payment of damages for failure to provide such
a crossing. Is this right the exclusive remedy for failure to per-
form the duty imposed on the railroad? We think not.
Land has always been a favorite subject of ownership in the
common law. The law has ever been solicitous to secure to a land-
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owner the use and enjoyment of his property in land. Courts of
equity have always considered the enforcements of rights in land
as within their jurisdiction, because of the peculiar efficacy of their
decrees in securing to the landowner the enjoyment of his owner-
ship. And, conversely, the inadequacy of a common law remedy of
damages, in such a case, has always been presumed. Are we now,
because this statute has conferred the common law remedy of dam-
ages, forced to the conclusion that the legislature thereby repudiated
these well-established policies of the law, above referred to, and
made their penalty imposed the sole recompense to the landowner?
We cannot believe that such was their intention, and in this decision,
we are upheld by the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, in the case of
Green vs. R. R. Co., supra, in which he said, "We have no hesi-
tancy in adjudging the statutory remedy prescribed by the Act to be
neither appropriate nor adequate for the injury complained of." In
the same opinion, the case of Dimmick vs. D. L. R. Co., 180 Pa. 460,
the case usually cited as upholding the contrary proposition, is
properly explained and reconciled.
Inasmuch as the remedy provided at law is determined not to
be the exclusive remedy for the enforcement of this statutory right,
the court of equity has ample grounds for granting the relief asked
for in this bill. Equity has jurisdiction over corporations by the Act
of June 16, 1836, P. L. 789. Having such jurisdiction, equity courts
have seen fit to exercise it in similar cases.
In Hacke's Appeal, 101 Pa. 245, the court held that equity will
prevent the obstruction of a right of way. In Marsh vs. L. & N. E.
R. R., 215 Pa. 141, equity enforced a right for the maintenance of a
crossing over a railroad, a case analagous to the case at bar, except
in that case, the right sought to be enforced was based on contract.
And in the case of Green vs. R. R. Co., supra, the court of equity
enforced a similar right based on the same statute.
We therefore decide that in the present case such a right as is
sought to be enforced did exist; that the court of equity has juris-
diction over the subject-matter; and that sufficient grounds have
been shown to warrant this court to extend its aid in the enforce-
ment of the right in question. We therefore grant the prayer of
the plaintiff's bill.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The opinion of the learned court below has correctly disposed of
the contentions raised by the counsel for the defense. Green vs.
Bali. and Ohio R. R. Co., 245 Pa. 35 is ample authority for so hold-
ing.
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We would, however, like to call the attention of the learned court
below to the conflict between the case cited and Dimmick et al vs.
D. L. and W. R. R. Co., 180 Pa. 468. As has been pointed out,
the two are reconciled and distinguished by the Green case, supra.
But we can not so easily accept this attempt at reconciliation. We
would rather say that the Green case, supra, has directly overruled
the earlier case. Had the aid of equity in the earlier case, been re-
fused definitely because of laches in demanding the remedy, the two
might well be distinguished. But it was definitely stated in the
Dimmick case that the reasons assigned by the lower court, viz,
adequacy and exclusiveness of the remedy at law, were "good."
Then, as a mere feather in balancing the scales, was added the
suggestion that the delay had not "improved" the position of the
plaintiff. The peculiar facts in that case, to wit, settlement of
previous damage and a specific agreement to build the crossing,
could neither add to nor detract from the specific rights of the
plaintiff or the specific duties and liabilities of the railroad.
Consequently we feel that the effort in Green vs. R. R., supra, to
distinguish the two, is an artificial and superficial attempt to cover
up a direct reversal, which courts are ever loath to admit.
But the court undoubtedly had power to reverse its former
holding and has done so. The equitable and beneficial results of the
latter holding cannot be questioned even though, in legal theory, the
former case had much in its favor.
The opinion of the learned court below is Affirmed.
JOHNSON VS. THE READING CO.
Automobiles-Negligence--Invitees--Contributory Negligence of
Driver
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ross invited Johnson for a ride in his automobile. Passing over
a route familiar to Ross but not to Johnson, the car crossed a rail-
road at grade. The presence of the railroad could be detected only
when within ten yards of it. The car was struck by an engine
running seventy miles an hour and which gave no warning whistle.
Ross drove on the tracks at thirty miles per hour without stopping or
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looking and Johnson, in the rear seat, said or did nothing. Johnson
is seeking to recover $5,000 from the railroad for personal injuries.
Miss Bogar, for Plaintiff.
Zakun, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Speakman, J. The plaintiff to recover at all must do so on
the ground that the defendant company was negligent in the op-
eration of its railroad at the point the injury was sustained.
There can be no doubt that the running of a train at the speed
of seventy miles per hour over a grade crossing where there were
no warning signs and where the crossing could be discovered
only ten yards away is such a negligent operation as to admit a re-
covery unless the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
That brings us to the real point of the case. Was the plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence?
It was held in Azinger vs. R. R. Co., 262 Pa. 242, that the
test of negligence of an invited guest, is his action or want of action
in the face of manifest danger, or danger known to him or which
it was his duty equally with the driver to observe.
Was the danger in this case so apparent? Since the crossing
could be detected only ten yards away, it would be hard to see
how the plaintiff's failure to see it would be negligence for it was
held in the same case, that a guest is under no duty to continually
observe the road ahead of him, and cannot be held negligent mere-
ly for failure to discover danger of which he is ignorant, al-
though he might have discovered had he been giving at-
tention to the road. There is absolutely nothing in the case to
show that the plaintiff saw the crossing at all. The facts state
only that its presence could be detected ten yards away and, to
follow the rule of that case, the plaintiff was certainly under no
duty equally with the driver to observe.
Even admitting the argument of the defendant that the driver
Ross was negligent, his negligence cannot be imputed to the plain-
tiff. Such negligence can only be imputed where the guest knows
of the danger, or the danger is so apparent that the guest is under
a duty equally with the driver to observe it.
It was held in Wolf vs. Sweeney, 270 Pa. 97 that the negligence
of the driver could not be imputed to the plaintiff as he had no
control over either the machine or the driver.
It was held also in Davis vs. American Ice Co. 285 Pa. 177 that
an invited guest and especially one who occupies a rear seat in the
car where no opportunity of control exists is in a different position;
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that he ordinarily is not concerned with the operation of the car
and can not be looked upon as joining with the driver in its oper-
ation merely from the fact that he happens to be an occupant.
It is clear that following the rules of the case cited, the plain-
tiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and the negligence of
the driver, if there was any, cannot, under the facts as stated, be
imputed to the plaintiff and we therefore render judgment for the
plaintiff in the amount of $5000 as damages for the injuries sustained.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court was correct in holding that there was joint
negligence on the part of railroad and Ross, the driver. This the
facts patently disclose. But what effect, if any, has Ross' negli-
gence on Johnson's right of recovery? Being an invitee the neg-
ligence of the driver can only be imputed to Johnson by an express
sanction. This does not appear.
Was Johnson guilty of contributory negligence by saying or
doing nothing? We think not. As has been said in Hermann vs.
R. I. Co., 36 R. I. 447, "The right degree of caution in many cases
may consist of inaction. In situations of great and sudden peril,
meddlesome interference with those having control, either by phy-
sical act or by disturbing suggestions and needless warnings, may
be exceedingly disastrous in results." That such is often the case
is a matter of common knowledge. Here an attempt to stop the
car or a loudly shouted warning would doubtless have caused their
deaths rather than mere injuries. Cf. Vocca vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 259
Pa. 42.
The question of his negligence being for the jury, and the
learned court here acting as a jury, it has reached a decision with
which we may not interfere.
Affirmed.
RICH'S ESTATE
Wilis-Duplicates--Probate-Presumption of Revocation-Dates--
Issues
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rich died August 1, 1922, leaving a will dated December 1, 1922.
This will was probated. Several months later a will dated July 30,
1922 was offered for probate and was refused. The will presented
was a duplicate carbon copy signed at the same time as the original.
The original had been placed in the testator's safe, but could not
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be found after his death. The proponents of the. will offered no
evidence concerning the original left with the testator. The court
declined to grant an issue and this appeal follows.
Tenenbaum, for Plaintiff.
Neil, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Slotkin, J. The Wills Act of 1917, P. L. 409, sec. 20, (a), (b)
provides in substance, that no will in writing shall be repealed
otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing, executed
and proved in a manner prescribed in the act, or by burning, cansel-
ling, obliterating or destroying same by testator or someone in his
presence and by his direction.
Although it is not deducible from the evidence as a fact that
the testator destroyed the will of July date, animo revocandi, yet
there is a legal presumption that he did so destroy it. Where a
will remains in the exclusive custody of a testator and there is no
testimony that it ever passed out of his possession, a presumption
arises from the continued possession and non-production of the will
after the testator's death that he destroyed it with the intention
of revoking it. Weber's Est,, 268 Pa. 7; Glockner vs. Glockner,
263 Pa. 393; Bate's Est., 286 Pa. 583. There has therefore in the
eyes of the law, been a repeal of the will by destruction, animo
revocandi, within the meaning of the Wills Act.
However, it was the privilege of the appellants to rebut this
presumption either by producing the original will or by laying a
proper foundation for the admission into evidence of the carbon
copy thereof, by showing its loss or destruction without the inten-
tion of revoking it. Hogman's Est., 270 Pa. 210.
The appellants contend that the will of December date was
evidently executed on December 1, 1921 and was therefore revoked
by the will of July date. This is a mere arbitrary supposition not
deduced from the evidence and for which there is absolutely no
grounds or justification.
Both parties have conceded the immateriality of the date on
the will. In this connection, we wish to refer to the Wills Act, sec.
9, which provides in substance that every will shall be construed,
with reference to the real and personal property devised and be-
queathed therein, to speak and take effect as if it had been exe-
cuted immediately before the death of the testator, unless a con-
trary intention appears in the will. The will bearing date of De-
cember 1, 1922, being the only will having a legal existence, is
deemed to have been executed immediately pereceding the tes-
tator's death, without regard to the date thereon. A date may be-
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come material in affecting the rights of persons claiming under
the will but no such circumstances exist in the case at bar. Baum's
Est., 269 Pa. 63.
It is further contended that as both copies of the July 30th will
were made at the same time and by the same mechanical operation,
both were originals, and the carbon copy is admissable in evidence.
It is a rule of evidence that the best evidence procurable must
be produced for admission into evidence. A carbon copy is clearly
not the- best evidence as long as the original is in existence. The
burden to prove the non-existence of the original because of loss or
destruction by the testator without the intention of revocation, is
on the party producing the carbon copy. Furthermore, as
already stated, the law presumes from the continued possession and
non-production of the original after the testator's death, a de-
struction with the intention of revoking it-a presumption that it
was the testator's intention that the property should not be dis-
tributed as per the destroyed will. To admit the copy would be to
re-establish an intention on the testator's part that the law recog-
nizes as having been abandoned by him. This is clearly not per-
missable. Bate's Estate, 286 Pa. 583. ,
The copy is further inadmissable because it occupies no higher
position than an unexecuted copy and is only evidence of the con-
tents of the original. The law having regarded the original as
revoked, the duplicate is likewise revoked. A will is a mere expres-
sion of intention, subject to revocation or change as the tes-
tator may deem expedient. Bates' Estate, supra.
It is the appellant's contention that the lower court erred in
refusing an issue to Common Pleas on a dispute of a question of fact.
By virtue of the hiatus in the evidence, namely, failure to prove
the existence of the original will, or its loss or destruction non animo
revocandi, the carbon copy has no legal existence and the question
as to the validity of an instrument cannot arise, where the law re-
gards that instrument as not being in existence. Furthermore, in a
will contest, it is discretionary with the court to decide whether
or not he shall submit the evidence to a jury and in such case it is
his duty and right to refuse to present it to a jury unless he feels
that the proper administration of justice calls for a verdict against
the will. Fleming's Estate, 280 Pa. 252.
In view of the foregoing, we hereby affirm the decision of tbe
learned court below.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The judgment is affirmed on the opinion of the learned court
below.
